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INTRODUCTION

Federal and state governments attempt to control the distribution of obscene' materials through a variety of methods, including
zoning2 and moral nuisance abatement laws. Recently, both federal
and state legislatures have resorted to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)4 to accomplish this goal. The
1. "Obscenity is not a synonym for pornography." A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN
9 (1981). Obscenity is a legal term of art that refers to indecency and
filth. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 595. For the
Supreme Court's current definition of obscenity, see infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
Pornography, on the other hand, refers generally to sexually explicit adult material that
depicts women as prostitutes and focuses on the role of women in providing sexual pleasure to
men. See A. DWORKIN, supra, at 200-01. Pornography is entitled to some protection from
government control. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329-31 (7th
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). One commentator has characterized pornography as
"low value" speech entitled to less first amendment protection than other forms of speech.
Sunstein, supra, at 591, 602-08.
2. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 46 (A Washington zoning
ordinance prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single-family or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or school.), reh'g
denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62-64 (1981)
(A New Jersey zoning ordinance did not allow live entertainment, whether nude dancing or
some other form of live presentation.); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
52-55 (plurality opinion) (Zoning ordinances adopted by the city of Detroit prohibited an adult
theater to be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses," or within 500 feet of
a residential area.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 206-07 (1975) (A Florida ordinance made it a public nuisance and a punishable
offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit motion pictures containing nudity, if the screen
was visible from a public street or place.). For a thorough discussion of the first amendment
issues raised when governmental bodies use zoning to regulate adult establishments, see
generally Recent Developments, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Ordinances
POSSESSING WOMEN

Regulating Adult Establishments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 328-29 (1986)

(Zoning laws must strictly adhere to requirements that protect first amendment rights.).
3. See infra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (West Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
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Act provides harsh remedies against purveyors of obscene materials.5
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the first
amendment to the Constitution 6 does not protect obscenity.7 Therefore, an injunction or forfeiture of obscene books and films is constitutional.' A prosecutor acting under RICO may seize obscene books
and films, as well as nonobscene protected materials, and seek permanent injunctions banning their future distribution. 9 Thus, RICO's
2301(D)(4)(u) (Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(a)(19) (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-17-103(5)(b)(VI) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-394(a)(11) (West 1985); FLA.

STAT. § 895.02(1)(a)(27) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(3)(A)(xii) (1988); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7803(a)(8) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Sec. 1) (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:41-1(1)(e) (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(2) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d)(17) (1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(I)(2)(b) (Anderson 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(10)(v) (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(6)(a)
(T) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4)(ff) (Supp. 1988). See infra notes 14-29 and
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (1978);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.3 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-105, 18-17-106 (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-397 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 895.04-.05 (1987); GA. CODE ANN.

§§ 16-14-6, 16-14-7 (1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7804(g) & (h), 18-7805 (1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-3, 2C:41-4 (West 1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-5, 75D-8, 75D-10 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-04, 12.1-06.105 (1985); OHIO Rpnv. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.32-.35 (Anderson 1987); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 1404, 1409 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.725 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7610-1603.5 (Supp. 1988).
Generally, there are two types of forfeiture statutes under federal law: a civil forfeiture
statute and a criminal forfeiture statute. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3182, 3376-77
(1984). The government commences civil forfeiture of crime-related property by seizing the
asset in an in rem proceeding. Id. at 3376. The asset's value determines whether a judicial or
an administrative proceeding occurs. Id. Because the forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the
case may be brought in the district where the property is located. Id.
Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, is an in personam proceeding against a criminal
defendant. Id. The forfeiture is a sanction against the convicted defendant. Id. A defendant
must, however, be found guilty of engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity before a
judgment of forfeiture is entered against him. Id. Once a forfeiture judgment is entered
against the convicted defendant, the government may seize the asset. Id. at 3376-77. This
does not, however, prevent the government from obtaining a restraining order against the
defendant's assets to prevent the defendant from transferring his assets prior to his conviction.
Id. at 3377. Unlike civil forfeiture, the assets remain in the custody of the defendant until he is
convicted for the underlying racketeering offenses. Id. at 3378. Therefore, the government
may seize the assets only when the defendant has been convicted and a forfeiture judgment has
been entered against him. Id.
6. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ...
U.S. CONST. amend. I. First
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .......
amendment protection of freedom of expression is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957). See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

8. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (E.D. Va. 1987) (An ex parte
restraining order enjoined the defendants from selling or disposing any property that a
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remedies go beyond specific injunctions ° and authorize the forfeiture
of a business' entire assets when a pattern of "racketeering activity""1
is proven. This raises troubling questions regarding the application of
RICO to obscenity. When the government seizes materials that later
are adjudged nonobscene, it suppresses future conduct and violates
the "doctrine of prior restraint"-a longstanding constitutional doc12
trine that prohibits restrictions on expression.
This Comment focuses on the conflict between federal and state
prosecutor may forfeit under RICO.); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 582-83 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559, 560 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (Sheriffs in two counties padlocked several adult
bookstores charged with violating RICO and seized their contents.). For specific federal and
state RICO provisions allowing a prosecutor to seize the assets of a defendant who has engaged
in a racketeering activity, see supra note 5.
10. A specific injunction is an injunction against the future distribution of a particular
obscene material. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957) (a
criminal statute authorizing an injunction order against a particular obscene book). Courts
have generally upheld the constitutionality of these injunctions. Id. at 444-45.
11. Under federal and most state RICO statutes, a "pattern of racketeering activity"
requires two acts or incidents of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(3) (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53.394(e) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(2)
(1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(d) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Sec. 1) (West 1986);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.390 (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:41-(d)(1) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(D) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 460.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.31(E) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 22, § 1402(5) (West Supp.
1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1003(6) (Supp. 1988).
Federal RICO provides examples of what constitutes a "racketeering activity," but fails to
give a general definition. Nevertheless, several states have defined racketeering activity.
Indiana's definition of "racketeering activity" is typical and provides: "'Racketeering activity'
means to commit, to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit a violation, or aiding and
abetting in a violation," of any of a number of enumerated predicate offenses. IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Sec. 1) (West 1986). See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4) (1978);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(5) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53.394(a) (West 1985); FLA.
STAT. § 895.02(1) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(3)(A) (1988); HAw. REV. STAT. § 842-1
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(a) (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(a) (Supp. 1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 207.390 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(1) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31(I) (Anderson 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(10) (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(6) (1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1003(9) (Supp. 1988).
12. The doctrine of prior restraint seeks to prevent the advance punishment of acts of
expression. Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11, 11 (1981
The doctrine, therefore, presumes that any governmental action that
prevents an expression from occurring is unconstitutional. Id. See infra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
There are generally two types of prior retraints. First, there is a governmental order or a
court injunction that prevents a person from engaging in certain types of communications.
See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02. The second type of prior restraint requires a license or
permit before one may engage in a particular type of expression. See, e.g., Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 & n. 1(1965). For a discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint, see
Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent
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regulation of obscene materials under RICO and the prior restraint
doctrine.1 3 It discusses the constitutionality of RICO's forfeiture provision as it applies to the predicate offense of obscenity. Section II of
this Comment reviews the background of RICO and obscenity law.
In addition, the Section examines the forfeiture provision of RICO as
it applies to adult bookstores and discusses the inconsistent treatment
of the constitutionality of this remedy by the courts. Section III analyzes the doctrine of prior restraint and describes the two-prong test
that courts use to determine the constitutionality of a statute that
implicates the first amendment. Further, this Section analyzes the
doctrine of prior restraint in the context of nuisance law. Finally,
Section IV applies the doctrine of prior restraint to RICO's forfeiture
provision and concludes that the forfeiture provision is a prior
restraint on the dissemination of nonobscene protected materials,
unless there is an extraordinary and compelling government interest
to uphold it as constitutional.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF

A.

Two DOCTRINES: RICO AND OBSCENITY

The Legislative History and Statutory Language of RICO

Congress enacted RICO, 4 Title IX of the Organized Crime
Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982);
Blasi, supra.
13. Federal RICO seeks to prevent organized crime in enterprises dealing with interstate
and international business, while state RICO focuses on intrastate organized crime.
Nevertheless, most state statutes are technically patterned after federal RICO. Baines v.
Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 145, 148, 688 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ct. App. 1984); Alvers v. State of
Indiana, 489 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 &
West Supp. 1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
CAL. PENAL CODE

§§

§§

13-2301 to 13-2317 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988);

186 TO 186.8 (WEST 1988); COLO. REV. STAT.

§§

18-17-101 to 18-17-

109 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-393 to 53-403 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 895.01 to
895.09 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to 16-14-15 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §6 842-1 to
842-12 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to 18-7805 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras.

1651-1660 (Smith-Hurd 1982) (restricted to narcotics racketeering); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-456 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1351-1356 (West Supp. 1988) (restricted to narcotics
racketeering); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to 97-43-11 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 207.350-.520 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-6.2 (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3042-1 to 30-42-6 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-1 to 75D-14 (1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to 12.1-06.1-08 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31 to
2923.36 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1401 to 1419 (West Supp. 1989); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 166.715-.735 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to 7-15-11 (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-1-1001 to 39-1-1010 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to 7610-1609 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.001-.904 (1988) (referred to as
"Criminal Profiteering Act"); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-.87 (West Supp. 1987).
Federal and state RICO are related in yet another way. Prior state RICO convictions for

dealing in obscene materials are admissible to prove acts of racketeering under federal RICO.
Pryba, 680 F. Supp. at 792.
14. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941
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Control Act of 197O,' s in an effort to combat, organized crime's
corruption of American business. 16 The legislative history of RICO
indicates that Congress intended to provide prosecutors with new
weapons of unprecedented scope in the fight against organized

crime. 17 The prosecutor's arsenal consists of new statutory offenses,18
evidence-gathering techniques,' 9 and a forfeiture provision.20 Con
gress enacted the forfeiture provision to punish the racketeer and per(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)), amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302, 901, 1020, 2301, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-44, 2135, 2143,
2192 (1984). President Reagan appointed an advisory committee to further the goal of
eradicating organized crime. Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (1983), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 12,507, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,835 (1985).
For a general discussion of RICO, see Third Annual Survey of White Collar Crime,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations(RICO), 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401 (1985).
15. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
16. During the last ten years organized crime in the United States has increased.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

Table 27 (1987). The number of arrests for specific offenses in 1978 totalled 7.6 million. Id.
Specific totals were: murder-14,456; gambling-44,672; arson-13,649; robbery-108,239; drug
abuse violations-477,213; and sex offenses, including prostitution and commercialized vice127,509. Id By 1987, the Crime Index had risen by almost 25 percent to 9.5 million persons
arrested for crime related offenses. Id. Specific totals were: murder-15,064; robbery- 114,439;
drug abuse violations-737,094; and sex offenses, including prostitution and commercialized
vice-169,987. Id.
17. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970) ("It
is the purpose of [RICO] to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States... by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime."); Id. at § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (The provisions of RICO shall be
liberally construed to achieve its purposes.).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). The relevant section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as principal ... to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1982). The Attorney General may serve a civil investigative demand
upon a person or enterprise who may possess any material relevant to a racketeering investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1968(a) (1982).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). The relevant section provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any
enterprise which he has established[,] operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982). For the respective states' forfeiture provisions, see supra note 5.
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manently separate him from the business he corrupted. 2'
Under federal and state RICO, any person who, through the
commission of two or more acts, directly or indirectly invests, acquires, maintains, or participates in an enterprise that constitutes a
22
pattern of racketeering activity is subject to criminal prosecution.
In an effort to prevent the distribution of obscene books and films,
Congress expanded RICO's definition of "racketeering activity" to
include "dealing in obscene matter." 23 The expansion of RICO's forfeiture provision to include obscene materials poses a threat to an
24
individual's constitutional rights under the first amendment.
RICO's remedies are among the most powerful weapons in the
21. Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 US.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 379, 383-84 (1980).
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1978); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-17-104 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-395 (West 1985); FLA. STAT.
§ 895.03 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. 16-14-4 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-2 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 18-7804 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 /2, para. 1654 (Smith-Hurd 1982) (restricted
to narcotics racketeering); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1353 (West 1988) (restricted to narcotics racketeering); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-5 (Supp.
1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.400 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-42-4 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-4 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-03 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.32 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1403 (West Supp. 1989); OR.
REV. STAT. § 166.720 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11004 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.82.060 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.83 (West Supp. 1987).
23. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020(1), 98 Stat. 2143
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988)). Before 1984, examples of
racketeering activities included any act involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1982). Several states, however, included obscenity as a predicate offense of RICO
before this amendment to federal RICO. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132301(D)(4)(u) (Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(5)(b)(VI) (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53-394(a)(11) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a)(27) (1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-14-3(3)(A)(xii) (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(a)(8) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-61 (Sec. 1) (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(1)(e) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d)(17) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. 166.715(6)(a)(T) (1987).
24. See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987); Western Business
Systems, Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ga. 1980); State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 745
P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479
N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989). See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying
text.
The forfeiture provision of RICO has raised constitutional issues other than the first
amendment. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting
that the forfeiture order may be grossly disproportionate and, therefore, violate the eighth
amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment); Pryba,
674 F. Supp. at 1511-12, 1516-17 (holding that the forfeiture provision of RICO is neither
vague or overbroad, nor does it constitute excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment and
does not violate due process); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(The forfeiture provision of RICO is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.). See also
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prosecutor's arsenal. The government uses the forfeiture provision to
attack the economic base of the racketeer, 25 and to separate him from
the source of his economic gain. 26 Before a court can issue an ex parte
seizure order that closes the premises and forfeits the assets of the
business, a prosecutor must show that an individual is engaged in
racketeering activity. 27 An individual violates RICO when he distributes obscene materials.28 Once the individual is convicted for having
engaged in racketeering activity, a prosecutor then uses the forfeiture
provision to seize property that was used in the course of the individual's illegal conduct.2 9 In Russello v. United States,3 ° the Supreme
Taylor, supra note 21, at 382-83 (Generally, RICO's forfeiture provision does not inflict cruel
and unsual punishment.).
Numerous constitutional challenges have been raised to RICO's statutory provisions. See
Feld, 155 Ariz. at 93, 745 P.2d at 151 (conducting an enterprise illegally through obscenity is
not an unconstitutionally vague offense); State v. Sappenfield, 505 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) aff'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 924-25 (1989) (RICO
is not unconstitutionally vague as to the predicate offense of obscenity.).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982). For the text to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), see supra note 20.
Before the forfeiture provision was adopted, fine and imprisonment were the only two
sanctions imposed against an individual who engaged in racketeering activities. Organized
Crime ControlHearings, 1970: Hearingson S. 30 Before the Subcomm. No. Five of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106, 107 (1970) (statements of Sen.
McClellan). Incarcerating or fining a defendant, however, had no effect on his ability to run
the business. By temporarily transferring the assets to a friend or family member, the
racketeer could continue to run the business from prison until his release. Id.
26. See Taylor, supra note 21, at 383-84.
27. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 929 (1989) (An ex parte seizure
order cannot be issued on mere probable cause that RICO violation has occurred.). See infra
note 55 and accompanying text.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (West Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4)
(u) (Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(a)(19) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17103(5)(b)(VI) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-394(a)(l 1) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)
(a)(27) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(3)(A)(xii) (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(a)(8)
(1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Sec. 1) (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(l)(e)
(West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(2) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d)
(17) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(I)(2)(b) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1402(10)(v) (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(6)(a)(T) (1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4)(fff) (Supp. 1988).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (1978); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 186.3 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-105, 18-17-106 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53-397 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 895.04-.05 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 1614-6, 16-14-7 (1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7804(g) & (h), 18-7805 (1987); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-30.5-3 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-3, 2C:41-4 (West 1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 75D-5, 75D-8, 75D-10 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-04, 12.1-06.1-05
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.32-.35 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 1404, 1409 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.725 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7610-1603.5 (Supp. 1988). Prosecutors may also seek revocation of a store's license and charter
through RICO's civil remedies. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-106(d) (1986); FLA.
STAT. § 895.05(d) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-6(a)(4) (1988); IDAHO CODE § 187805(d)(5) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-4(a)(5) (West 1982). First amendment concerns
do not arise in these situations because there is no seizure of a business' assets.
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Russello,

a member of a group of individuals associated for the purpose of
committing arson with the intent to defraud insurance companies,
was convicted for engaging in racketeering activity.3 2 The Court held

that forfeitable interests include not only the property used while the
defendant engaged in racketeering activity, but also include all profits
and proceeds derived from such activity.33

A problem arises with the execution of the forfeiture provision
because many adult bookstores and theaters contain materials that are
not considered obscene, and therefore, are protected by the first amendment. 34 "One obscene book on the premises of a book store [sic]

does not make an entire store obscene." ' 3- An injunction that closes
a bookstore or theater and allows the forfeiture of all the assets halts
the future sale of other materials that may not be obscene. Thus,
the forfeiture provision may infringe upon the bookstore owner's first

amendment right to free speech with respect to these nonobscene
materials.36
Like the federal government, a number of states have used their
RICO laws to combat the distribution of obscene material, by closing
adult bookstores and theaters, and demand forfeiture of the business'
assets.37 State courts addressing this issue have reached different

results on the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision. Some
30. 464 U.S. 16 (1983). For a discussion of Russello v. United States, see Note, The
Forfeiture of Profits under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act: Enabling
Courts to Realize RICO's Potential, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 747 (1984); Note, RICO-Criminal
Forfeiture of Proceeds of Racketeering Activity under RICO, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
893 (1984).
31. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21-22.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 28-29.
34. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
35. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 613, 203 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1974).
36. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23; Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
37. Federal RICO was not used in this manner until August 1987. United States v. Pryba,
674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987). In Pryba, the defendants operated a number of retail video
stores and were indicted on several counts of alleged RICO violations, three of which involved
obscenity violations, with accompanying criminal forfeiture provisions. Id. at 1507-08. The
court issued an ex parte restraining order to prevent the defendants from disposing of certain
assets that might be forfeitable under RICO's forfeiture provisions. Id. at 1508. The defendants claimed that RICO's forfeiture provision acted as a prior restraint on free speech. Id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
forfeiture provision of federal RICO was constitutional. Id. at 1516. It. reasoned that the
provision did not act as a prior restraint on free speech because the defendants had an
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether the speech was obscene prior to forfeiture. Id. at
1512. The court, having decided that the materials were obscene, seized the materials as a
subsequent punishment for the defendants' criminal conduct. Id. at 1512-13.
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courts have dismissed prior restraint claims and upheld as constitutional RICO's forfeiture provision, characterizing it as an in rem penalty for past illegal conduct.38 Other courts, however, have held that
it is unconstitutional, reasoning that it acts as a prior restraint on protected speech and materials. 39 These state decisions may serve as a
guide in determining the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision
under federal RICO.
In Western Business Systems, Inc. v. Slaton,4° the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia upheld Georgia's
RICO forfeiture provision as it applied to the predicate offense of
obscenity.4" In Western Business Systems, purveyors of sexually explicit materials moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the future
application of Georgia's RICO Act. 42 The court denied the preliminary injunction and held that the Act did not infringe upon the
defendant's first amendment right to freedom of speech.43 In dicta,
the court further stated that Georgia's RICO law provides for the
forfeiture of property "of whatever nature and no matter how inoffensive, if it is acquired with racketeering proceeds."' The seizure,
therefore, is unrelated to the contents. 45 Moreover, the court reasoned that property is forfeited not because of any likelihood that it
may be obscene, but because it is property realized or gained from
crime.46
The Supreme Court of Indiana declared its RICO statute constitutional in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith.47 In 4447 Corp., the state alleged
38. See Western Business Systems, Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ga. 1980); 4447
Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559, 564-65
(Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S.Ct. 916 (1989). See
infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
39. State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 745 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1270
(1988). See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
40. 492 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
41. Id. at 515.
42. Id. at 513. Ordinarily, in a RICO action, the prosecutor seeks to prevent the defendant from disposing of certain assets. 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 581-83. In Western
BusinessSystems, however, the bookstore owners initiated the action to prevent enforcement of
the RICO statute. Western Business Systems, 492 F. Supp. at 513.
Several RICO statutes provide a private right of action or right to restitution with treble
damages for those individuals injured by racketeering activity. See, e.g., Feld, 155 Ariz. at 97,
745 P.2d at 155 (construing the Arizona RICO statute, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132314(D)(4) (1978)).
43. Western Business Systems, 492 F. Supp. at 515.
44. Id. at 514.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 504 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
109 S.Ct. 916 (1989). The defendants moved to vacate the injunctive orders providing for
seizure of adult bookstore contents and their closing. 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d
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that several bookstores were part of an illegal enterprise that contained sexually oriented books, magazines, films, and videos for sale
or exhibition.4 8 Invoking Indiana's Civil Remedies for Racketeering
Activity (CRRA) statute, the state sought civil injunctive relief to bar
further racketeering violations based on the predicate offense of
obscenity.4 9 Simultaneously, the prosecutor filed a "Verified Petition
for Seizure of Property Subject to Forfeiture."50 Two Indiana county
courts issued ex parte seizure orders based on the state's allegations.5 1
In one of the counties, two bookstores were permitted to continue
operating, while only an unopened bookstore was sealed.5 2 In the
other county, however, all of the bookstores were sealed and the contents seized. 3 The owners alleged that the ex parte seizure orders
were an unconstitutional prior restraint on their first amendment
rights.5 4 The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the RICO/CRRA
578, 580 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985). The circuit court denied the motion. Id. The Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed and held that the injunctive remedies, seizure, and forfeiture sanctions of
state RICO constituted unconstitutional prior restraints when applied to the predicate offense
of obscenity. Id. at 585.
48. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 561-62.
49. Id.
50. Id. Attached to the pretrial seizure petition was a probable cause affidavit sworn by a
police officer, alleging that a violation of RICO had occurred. Id.
51. 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 582-83. Both circuit court cases involved the constitutionality of RICO's forfeiture provision and were consolidated on appeal. Id. at 580. In
the trial court case prosecuted in Marion County, the defendants had never been convicted
of violating the state's obscenity statute. Id. at 580-83. In the Ft. Wayne case, however,
the prosecutor cited thirty-nine previous obscenity convictions constituting a pattern of
racketeering activity. Id. at 583. This distinction may raise a question as to whether the state
has a cause of action against the defendants in Marion County without the predicate violation
of obscenity. See J.N.S., Inc. v. State, 712 F.2d 303, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1983) (Distributors of
sexually explicit materials had twice been charged but had not been convicted of obscenity
violations; the distributors had not suffered sufficient actual or threatened injury to present a
"case or controversy" under Article III of the Constitution.). But see Fort Wayne Books, Inc.
v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 926 (1989) (There is no constitutional basis that alleged predicate
acts used in a RICO/obscenity prosecution must be "affirmed convictions"); United States v.
Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978) (Under federal RICO, conviction of the
underlying offense is not required.), reh 'g en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
846 (1979). Federal and several state RICO statutes do not mention the word "conviction."
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-3 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-7804
(1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1353 (West Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-3(a) (West
1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-4(b) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-3 (1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-1603.5 (Supp. 1988). Instead, the statutes speak only of committing a
"violation" of any of the enumerated offenses. Id. But see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-17-105
(1986); FLA. STAT. § 895.04 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-5(a) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-43-7 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.410 (1983); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.30
(McKinney Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1005 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.84 (West Supp. 1987).
52. 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 582.
53. Id. at 583.
54. Id.
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statute and the pretrial seizure order was constitutional." In discussing the RICO/CRRA statute, the court adopted the dicta in Western
Business Systems, Inc. v. Slaton5 6 and held that if the elements of a
pattern of racketeering activity are shown, then the assets are subject
to forfeiture." The court further held that the Indiana RICO statute
met the standards of procedural due process because a forfeiture hearing was held within a reasonable time after the petition for seizure was
filed.5 8
55. 447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 565-67. As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court held
that a pretrial seizure order removing books and films from a bookstore based on mere
probable cause to believe that the books and films were obscene is unconstitutional. Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 928-29 (1989). Mere probable cause to believe
that there are valid grounds to seize a bookstore's assets is insufficient to remove the sale of
presumptively protected books and films. Id. at 929. When the first amendment is involved,
there is an exception to the general rule that all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of
a crime may be seized on probable cause that a violation has occurred. Id. at 927 (citing Lo-Ji
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979)). The Court stated that the risk of prior
restraint concerning materials protected by the first amendment motivated this rule. Id. at
928. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (Although a single copy of a film may
be seized for evidentiary matters based on probable cause, seizing films to destroy them or to
prevent their distribution or exhibition is a very different matter.); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v.
Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per curiam) (A warrant authorizing the seizure of materials
presumptively protected by the first amendment may not be based solely on the allegations of a
police officer that the sought-after materials are obscene, but instead must be supported by
affidavits setting forth specific facts.); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,
208 (1964) (Seizing and destroying books on the belief that the books are obscene is
unconstitutional because it does not adequately safeguard against the suppression of
nonobscene books.). But see Western Business Systems, Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513, 514
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (A court may issue an ex parte seizure order upon a showing of probable
cause that an individual has violated RICO and that his property is subject to forfeiture.).
In determining that the pretrail order was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court expressly
stated that it was not deciding the constitutionality of post-trial forfeiture or of any civil posttrial sanction authorized by RICO. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 928-29, 928 n. 11. This
Comment discusses the constitutionality of the post-trial forfeiture of federal and state RICO.
56. 492 F. Supp. 513, 514 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
57. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 565.
58. Id. at 567. RICO's forfeiture provision raises another constitutional issue regarding
the suppression of obscene materials. It is well settled that speech may be suppressed pursuant
to certain constitutionally required procedures. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
In Freedman, the state of Maryland had a statute that required all films to be previewed by the
Maryland State Board of Censors. Id. at 52 & n. 1. After being convicted for violation of this
statute, a film exhibitor challenged the constitutionality of this statute alleging that it acted as
an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. Id. at 52-54. The Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed the exhibitor's conviction. 233 Md. 498, 505, 197 A.2d 232, 235-36 (Ct.
App. 1964). The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and provided three safeguards
to ensure that obscene materials would be constitutionally enjoined: First, the censor must
bear the burden of proof that the film is unprotected by the first amendment; second, an
adversarial, prompt, and final adjudication on the issue of obscenity must be assured by statute
or by a judicial determination; and third, any prior restraint before judicial review must be
strictly limited in duration. Id. at 58-61. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S.

308 (1980) (reaffirms the Freedman principles).
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Other state courts have held RICO's forfeiture provision unconstitutional, however. In State v. Feld, 9 the state indicted two individual defendants and a corporate defendant for showing obscene films.'
The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the RICO forfeiture provision was unconstitutional because it permitted the sale and forfeiture
of a firm's assets when only a portion of the assets were found to be
obscene.61 The court reasoned that because the sanction restricted
future, presumptively protected speech, rather than punished the past
distribution of unprotected speech, it was an unconstitutional prior
restraint.62
B.

The Law of Obscenity

The courts historically have sought to protect an individual's first
amendment rights. 63 The Supreme Court, however, does not treat
this right to first amendment protection as absolute. 61 Speech
may be abridged without violating the first amendment if the time,
place, or manner of the speech makes the suppression reasonable. 65
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,66 for example, the Supreme Court
Under federal RICO, the ex parte seizure order provides for forfeiture only after the
defendant has been convicted of racketeering activity and the property was used in, or derived
from, the criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982). On the other hand, several state
RICO forfeiture provisions authorize the government or law enforcement agent to seize the
property before such property has been adjudicated obscene. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 344-30.5-3 (West 1986). The issue arises whether the ex parte order and seizure absent any
proceeding are constitutional, or whether an adversarial proceeding is required to determine
the obscenity of each item prior to the seizure of such materials. See Sanders v. State, 231 Ga.
608, 612-13, 203 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1974) (Under nuisance law, a temporary restraint against
obscene materials is authorized only after an adversary hearing that makes a prompt
determination of whether or not an item is obscene.).
59. 155 Ariz. 88, 745 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
60. Id. at 90, 745 P.2d at 148.
61. Id. at 97, 745 P.2d at 155. The court did not, however, declare the entire RICO
scheme unconstitutional, but held that only the forfeiture provision of RICO was unconstitutional. Id. at 98, 745 P.2d at 156. The court reasoned that where a statute is in part
both constitutional and unconstitutional, and if the sections are severable, then those sections
found to be constitutional will be upheld and those found to be unconstitutional will be
rejected. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
64. Id. at 483. On the theory of the first amendment, one commentator has stated:
[The] absolutist position (regarding first amendment rights], whereby any law
which for any reason and in any degree punishes or restricts speech is said to be
unconstitutional, has never been accepted by the Supreme Court, and, in fact, has
been denied by the Court in a long series of opinions, both those which upheld
the free speech claim, and those which denied it.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-3 (1984).
65. M. NIMMER, supra note 64, at 2-4.
66. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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stated that certain limited classes of speech like the "lewd and
obscene" are not protected by the first amendment. 67 The Court reasoned that this kind of speech does not warrant protection because it
has only slight social value, as compared to the social interests of
order and morality.68 Confirming Chaplinsky's dicta, the Court in

Roth v. United States69 held that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press."' 70 Thus, an individual
does not have a first amendment right to distribute materials defined
as "obscene."
Several attempts have been made to define "obscenity. ' 71 In the
landmark case of Miller v. California,7 2 the Supreme Court set forth

the current standard of obscenity with a three-part test. 3 Under the
Miller standard, a work is subject to state regulation, if under prevailing community standards and taken as a whole by an average person,
it: first, appeals to the prurient interest; second, depicts or describes
in a patently offensive manner certain sexual conduct defined by state

law; and third, lacks serious artistic, literary, scientific, or political
value. 74 The Court stated that sex and nudity could not be depicted
without limit by films or pictures sold in public places. 75 Furthermore, the Court stated that the primary concern is that the material
in question be judged by the "average person," and not by a sensitive
67. Id. at 571-72. Other types of unprotected speech also include "the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words.'" Id. at 572.

68. Id.
69. 354 U.S. 476, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
70. Id. at 485. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) (Obscene
material is speech that is not entitled to first amendment protection.); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23 (Obscene material is not protected by the first amendment.), reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
881 (1973).
71. The early standard adopted by many American courts was delineated in the English
case of The Queen v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin standard measured the work by
its effect on persons specially susceptible to immoral influences. Id. at 371. In 1957, the
Supreme Court rejected the Hicklin standard and held that the test for obscenity was "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Court
defined "prurient" as having "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 486. The standard
was later changed to include three elements: First, "the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex;" second, "the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;" and third, "the material is utterly without redeeming social
value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
72. 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
73. Id. at 24. But see State v. Henry, 78 Or. App. 392, 405, 717 P.2d 189, 196-97 (Ct.
App. 1986) (en banc) (holding that an obscenity statute patterned after the Miller standard was
unconstitutionally vague).
74. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
75. Id. at 25-26.
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person.7 6

In ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,7" decided the same day as
Miller, the Court held that states could regulate the distribution of
obscene materials.78 In ParisAdult Theatre, a movie theater exhibited
two obscene films."9 The theater posted a sign on the door limiting
the entrance to those persons over twenty-one years of age.8 0 The
Court held that states have a legitimate interest in regulating obscene
materials, and that restricting admission to "consenting adults" did
not give rise to constitutional protection." States, therefore, can ban
obscenities displayed in adult movie theaters and bookstores, so long
as the applicable law does not infringe on the owner's first amendment
8 2
rights concerning nonobscene materials.
III.

THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

Laws that attempt to regulate adult bookstores impact on first
amendment protections. In determining whether such laws infringe
on a bookstore owner's first amendment right to freedom of speech,
the courts engage in a two-part test. First, the court must determine
whether such sanction acts as a "prior restraint." A prior restraint on
speech or publication is the most egregious type of first amendment
infringement.8 3 A "prior restraint" on speech suppresses an act of
expression in advance, instead of punishing the expression after it
enters the market place. 84 Such restraints are constitutional only if
the material suppressed is unprotected obscenity.8 5 Otherwise, any
system of prior restraint
bears a heavy presumption against its consti86
tutional validity.
76. Id. at 33.

77. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
78. Id. at 57-58.
79. Id. at 51. The two films, Magic Mirror and It All Comes Out in the End, were
characterized as "hard core pornography" by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Id. at 51-52. See
generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (Private possession of obscene materials
by a consenting adult is not a criminal act.).
80. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 52.
81. Id. at 68-69. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that obscene materials were
protected by the fundamental right of privacy. Id. at 65-67.
82. Id. at 69.
83. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
84. See Blasi, supra note 12, at 11 (Acts of expression may not be regulated "in advance.").
85. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (A statute prohibiting distribution
of materials showing children engaged in sexual conduct is constitutional.); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973) (A statute that bans the commercial distribution
of obscene materials is constitutional.); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445
(1957) (A statute providing for injunctions against obscene materials is constitutional.).
86. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57
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A finding that a law acts as a prior restraint, however, does not
mean that it is unconstitutional. In the second phase of the analysis,
the court must examine the government's interest in restraining an
individual's first amendment rights. Only extraordinary and compelling state interests that cannot be served by less restrictive alterna87
tives can limit first amendment rights and justify a prior restraint.
The Supreme Court has held that prior restraints may be constitutional only in "exceptional cases."" 8 These "exceptional cases"
include obscenity, 9 the publication of sensitive materials during wartime,' and incitements of violence and overthrow of the government
by force. 9 ' Because of this difficult standard, the determination that a
statute is a prior restraint in the first part of the test usually amounts
to a finding of unconstitutionality. 92
State courts that have held the forfeiture provision of RICO unconstitutional have reasoned that it acts as a prior restraint on protected materials. 93 In reaching this result, state courts have relied on
cases construing moral nuisance abatement statutes. 94 These moral
nuisance abatement laws have been used by the states to close adult
bookstores and theaters. 95 Bookstores constitute a nuisance and vio(1965) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931).
The common law also prohibited prior restraints on speech: "Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequence of his own temerity." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
87. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (The protection against prior restraints is not absolutely
unlimited.).
88. Id.
89. Id. Unlike obscene materials, sexually explicit but nonobscene materials are entitled to
the same protection as other forms of expressions. 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578,
584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S.Ct. 916 (1989).
90. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
91. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
92. See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
93. See State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 97, 745 P.2d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 1987), cerL denied, 108
S. Ct. 1270 (1988); 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 592.
94. 4447 Corp., 479 N.E.2d at 587. Bookstore owners view the forfeiture proceedings
under RICO as the functional equivalent of a nuisance or obscenity action. Id. The Supreme
Court of Indiana disagreed in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, but failed to state its reason for so
doing. 504 N.E.2d at 564.
95. See General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 661, 320 So. 2d 668, 671
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (An action was brought under Alabama's Red Light
abatement statute that prohibits showing obscene motion pictures.); People ex rel. Busch v.
Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 47, 550 P.2d 600, 602 (1976) (An action was brought
to enjoin the exhibition of obscene books and films under California's Red Light abatement
statute and under the general public nuisance statute.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
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late public health laws when they sell obscene materials. 96 Once an
establishment is found to have sold obscene materials, a padlock order
closes the entire premises, usually for one year. 97 Upon entry of a
final judgment, the defendant forfeits all property used in conducting
the nuisance. 98 The majority of courts that have addressed moral nuisance abatement laws have held that the padlock provision is unconstitutional because the provision acts as a prior restraint that infringes
on an individual's first amendment rights. 99
Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 610-11, 203 S.E.2d 153, 155-56 (1974) (A Georgia nuisance

statute prohibited the selling or distribution of obscene materials and films.); State ex rel. Blee
v. Mohney Enter., 154 Ind. App. 244, 245, 289 N.E.2d 519, 520 (Ct. App. 1972) (An Indiana
statute prohibited the maintaining of a nuisance and provided that the building maintaining
such nuisance would be closed.). Generally, there are three kinds of nuisance statutes. There
are Red Light abatement laws and general nuisance statutes, which do not refer to obscenity.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-140 (1977); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (West 1970); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11225 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1987); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985). There are also modern moral nuisance abatement
statutes, which are drafted to deal specifically with obscenity. These statutes generally incorporate the Miller definition of obscenity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 823.13 (1987); IDAHO
CODE §§ 52-401 to 52-417 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 3767.03-.07 (Anderson 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts 4666-4667 (Vernon 1952).
96. Nuisance is generally defined as any activity injurious to the safety, health, or morals
of the public. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON

THE LAW OF TORTS 643 n.2 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Commonwealth v. So. Covington &
Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918)).
97. The typical nuisance abatement law provides that the government, or any private
citizen who executes a bond can bring an action for abatement of a moral nuisance. See, e.g.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (1987). Upon a showing of good cause, the court may issue an
ex parte temporary restraining order preventing the defendant and all other persons from
removing any personal property from the premises. Id. at § 19-2.3. The defendant may then
file a motion to dissolve such order. Id. The court must conduct an adversary hearing after
the filing of such motion. Id. If the court grants the preliminary injunction, the officer serving
such order makes an inventory of the personal property and contents on the premises where
such nuisance is alleged to exist. Id. Once a nuisance is established, final judgment is entered
enjoining the defendant from maintaining the nuisance. Id. at § 19-5. All obscene materials
are then destroyed, and all proceeds received are forfeited. Id. The final order may provide for
a padlock order closing down the premises. Id. Thus, the padlock order and RICO's forfeiture provision are similar sanctions. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at § 19-5.
99. See Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1983) (A
city ordinance providing for revocation of a business' license where the licensee exhibited
obscene videotapes was held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.); Nihiser v. Sendak, 405
F. Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (A nuisance statute which prohibited a theater from
producing or displaying obscene films was held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.),
vacated, 423 U.S. 976 (1975), aff'd on appeal after remand,431 U.S. 961 (1977); Sanders, 231
Ga. at 613, 203 S.E.2d at 157 (A Georgia statute providing for the closure of a bookstore upon
evidence that some of its magazines were obscene was unconstitutional.); New Rivieria Arts
Theatre v. State ex rel. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 659-60, 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (1967) (An
injunction prohibiting the showing of any film, even those not obscene, was unconstitutional.).
For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of prior restraints in the context of nuisance
abatement statutes, see Note, Pornography,Padlocks,and PriorRestraints: The Constitutional
Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1478 (1983).
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The classic case exemplifying the heavy -presumption against
the constitutionality of prior restraints is Near v. Minnesota ex rel
Olson."co In Near, the Minneapolis Saturday Press was closed down,
pursuant to a state statute, because it published a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper, and was, therefore, deemed a public
nuisance."10 The judgment permanently enjoined the Press from publishing the newspaper.102 The Supreme Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional on the grounds that it constituted an impermissible prior restraint. 103 The Court noted that the statute was aimed at
preventing, rather than punishing speech,"° ' and therefore, conflicted

with the aim of the first amendment to prevent any prior restraints on
publication. 105

In certain cases, courts have adopted the doctrine of prior restraint to prevent a nuisance statute from restricting the distribution
of printed, nonobscene materials. For example, in State ex reL Blee v.
Mohney Enterprises, °0 an Indiana statute provided that any building
deemed a nuisance would be closed. 107 The plaintiff sought an injunction against the owners of an adult bookstore for creating a nuisance
by selling obscene materials.108 The court held that an injunction that
seeks to enjoin the distribution of any periodical, including nonobscene printed materials, is a restraint on first amendment rights. °1
Two years later, in General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton,1 10 the

Supreme Court of Alabama faced the issue of suppression of nonprinted materials. 11 The doctrine of prior restraint prevented a nuisance statute from depriving an individual of his first amendment
rights prospectively. 11 2 In General Corp., the state alleged that the
defendants had been showing obscene films at a movie theater.'1 3 The
100. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
101. Id. at 706.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 723.
104. Id.at 715.
105. Id.at 713.
106. 154 Ind. App. 244, 289 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
107. Id.at 244-45, 289 N.E.2d at 520 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-30-2-1; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-2701 (Bums 1956)).
108. Id. The materials included magazines, periodicals, and a movie containing pictures of
nude and semi-nude males and females in suggestive poses engaging in various masochistic and
sadistic activities. Id. Although the court did not decide that the materials were obscene, they
found it difficult to find any redeeming social value in these materials. Id.
109. Id. at 248, 289 N.E.2d at 521. In dicta, the court stated that a statute may not
"prohibit dissemination of materials ... not yet ... printed." Id.
110. 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
111. Id. at 661, 320 So. 2d at 671.
112. Id.at 666, 320 So. 2d at 676.
113. Id.at 661, 320 So. 2d at 671. Because of the unique nature of motion picture
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Supreme Court of Alabama declared its Red Light abatement law
applicable to obscenity, 1 4 but held the statute's padlock provision
unconstitutional.'1 5 The court further held that the showing of obscene materials in the past was not a sufficient compelling interest to
deprive an individual of his first amendment rights in the future." 6
The court suggested, however, that an injunction focused on a specific
obscene film may fall outside the contours
of the doctrine of prior
11 7
restraint and be held constitutional.
The minority of courts that have upheld padlock orders have
narrowly construed the applicable nuisance statute. In State ex rel.
Ewing v. "Without a Stitch,",I the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a
statute closing a theater for one year after the theater showed a single
obscene film. 119 The court held that the nuisance abated by the statute was limited to a specific obscene film; therefore, the owner was
prohibited only from showing that particular film. 2 ' The court suggested that a statute cannot require the theater owner to ensure that
no obscene films would be shown in the future, implying that such a
requirement would create an unconstitutional prior restraint on the
12
defendant's activities. '
Notwithstanding the previous recognition that certain activities
of commercial adult bookstores are constitutionally protected under
the doctrine of prior restraint, the Supreme Court recently refused to
acknowledge the presence of a first amendment issue in certain limdistribution, a film would be classified obscene and thereby would exceed first amendment
protection, even before a written description of the same subject. Id. at 663, 320 So. 2d at 672.
Therefore, when a court holds that a statute acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint towards
exhibiting future films, it follows that the statute must act as an unconstitutional prior restraint
towards written materials as well.
114. Id. at 664, 320 So. 2d at 674. The Red Light abatement statutes usually define public
nuisance as "any place in or upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution" occurs. ALA.
CODE § 6-5-140 (1977). See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (West 1982); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985). Although these do not explicitly refer to obscenity,
courts have construed "lewdness" to include obscenity. See Sweeton, 294 Ala. at 664, 320 So.
2d at 674.
115. Sweeton, 294 Ala. at 666, 320 So. 2d at 675.
116. Id. at 666, 320 So. 2d at 676.
117. Id. See also People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 57, 550
P.2d 600, 609 (For a nuisance statute to be held constitutional, it must be directed at books
and films adjudged obscene.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
118. 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nor. Art Theater
Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
119. Id. at 104, 307 N.E.2d at 917.
120. Id. at 105, 307 N.E.2d at 918.
121. Id. But see Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365, 1371 (4th Cir. 1982) (An
injunction prohibiting future distribution of materials not yet declared obscene was held to be
constitutional.).
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ited circumstances. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,122 the Court held
that the first amendment does not preclude closure of a bookstore
where prostitution takes place on its premises.' 23 The defendants, in
Arcara, operated an adult bookstore that sold sexually explicit publications and had booths available for viewing sexually explicit movies. 1 24 In addition to the sale. of sexually explicit materials, illicit
sexual activities, including the solicitation of prostitution, occurred on
the premises. 25 A New York statute authorized the closure of any
building found to be a nuisance, if the building was used as a place for
prostitution and lewdness.1 26 The statute, however, did not provide
for the seizure of the contents of the building. 27 The defendants
argued that closing the bookstore interfered with their first amend28
ment right to sell nonobscene books on the premises.'
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, stating that the factual
situation in Arcara did not trigger the application of the first
amendment. 29 The Court reasoned that the sexual activity that
occurred on the bookstore premises involved nonexpressive activity,
which was beyond the scope of first amendment protection. 30 In
addition, the Court rejected a prior restraint argument because the
defendants were free to carry on their bookselling business at another
location.' 3' Finally, the Court concluded that unlawful, public sexual
conduct could not be cloaked in legality by relying on the fact that the
store also engaged in bookselling - a protected first amendment
activity. 32 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized
that if a nuisance statute was used as a pretext to close down a book122. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). For a thorough discussion of Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., see
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-FirstAmendment-First Amendment Does Not PrecludeClosure of

Adult Bookstore Where Illegal Activity Occurs on Premises, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 382
(1987).
123. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
124. Id. at 698. No issue was presented as to whether the movies or other materials were
obscene. Id.
125. Id. at 698-99:
126. Id. at 699-700 (referring to N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2320, 2329 (McKinney
1985)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 700.
129. Id. at 707.

130. Id. The Court held that illegal sexual activities like prostitution, carry no element of
protected expression. Id. at 705. First amendment protections are not triggerred by linking
together the words "sex" and "books." Id. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill
Realty Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 32, 39, 478 A.2d 1334, 1338 (1984) (A nuisance statute that
provides for the closure of a bookstore where illicit sexual activities occurred was upheld as
constitutional.); Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va. 383, 391, 323 S.E.2d 86, 90
(1984) (Closing down a bookstore where illicit sexual activities occurred is constitutional.).
131. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 n.2.
132. Id. at 707.
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store because it sold indecent books, such action would trigger first
33
amendment protection. 1
Apart from the limited holding of Arcara, any method of curtailing obscenity rests on the following general rule: A sanction
against an adult bookstore that suppresses protected speech, as well as
unprotected obscenity, acts as a prior restraint and violates the adult
bookstore owner's first amendment rights.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT TO
RICO's FORFEITURE PROVISION

The constitutionality of RICO's forfeiture provision hinges on
whether the provision operates as a prior restraint. 13 4 To determine
whether a prior restraint exists, one must examine the sanction itself.
The typical padlock order under a moral nuisance abatement law
provides for the closure of an adult bookstore or theater for one year
and the ban of all personal property from the premises. 135 A majority
of courts have held that such orders are prior restraints. 136 RICO
imposes even more severe sanctions than moral nuisance abatement
laws because it permits seizure orders of indefinite duration and
creates remedies of permanent forfeiture.' 37 The forfeiture provision
may, therefore, violate the first amendment because it acts as an
unconstitutional prior restraint on both present and future protected
materials.
133. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Prior restraints occur when the government suppresses speech "in advance" of
distribution. Prior restraints on protected speech are presumptively unconstitutional. See
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965)
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
See also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Under the moral nuisance abatement law,
the defendant typically forfeits obscene books and films, and property such as furniture,
instruments, equipment, and fixtures. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 52-404 (1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 19-2.3 (1987).
136. See General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42,
550 P.2d 600 (1976); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); State ex rel. Blee v.
Mohney Enter., 154 Ind. App. 244, 289 N.E.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Ewing v.
"Without A Stitch", 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974), appealdismissed sub nom. Art
Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
137. See 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 589 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated,
504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct.
916 (1989). The permanent forfeiture extends to protected materials and to neutral
instrumentalities, such as bookshelves and camera equipment. Id.
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In 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 31 the Supreme Court of Indiana
held that RICO does not operate as an impermissible prior restraint
as applied to the predicate offense of obscenity. 39 The state alleged
that RICO seeks the seizure as punishment for past criminal activities, 14 and does not attempt to enjoin or restrain future activities. 1 4'
This argument, however, is tenuous because the forfeiture provision
cannot be seen as an in rem punishment for past behavior. The constitutionality of a statute depends upon an examination of its substance and not its form. 42 A statute must be tested by its effect and
not solely its intent. 143
The Supreme Court in Near held that a statute that suppresses
future publication of a newspaper was unconstitutional. 44 The Court
stressed that the decision rested on the adverse effect the injunction
had on future publications, and not on the validity of the charges
against the public officials.' 4- Similarly, RICO's forfeiture provision
138. 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub

no,. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S.Ct. 916 (1989).
139. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 563-64.
140. Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 10, 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind.
1987). In State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981),
appealdismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982), the court upheld a nuisance statute that provided for a
forfeiture or closure order of a business. Id.at 458, 631 P.2d at 629. The court viewed the
forfeiture sanction as an in rem penalty against property used in the past for the crime of
exhibiting obscene materials. Id. at 457, 631 P.2d at 628. The Kidwell court cited the
Supreme Court opinion in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974),
as support for its holding. Id. In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court held that a yacht used for
illegal drug trafficking could be seized under a forfeiture statute. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at
686-90. The Kidwell court noted that the seizure deprived the violator of economic gain and
was, therefore, punishment for past illegal activities. Kidwell, 102 Idaho at 457, 631 P.2d at
628. Unlike the illegal economic activity in Calero-Toledo, the Kidwell court dealt with both
protected and unprotected speech. Id. at 453, 631 P.2d at 624.
141. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 563. The state alleged that the bookstore owners'
inconvenience was caused by their participation in a pattern of criminal activity and not
caused by the state's desire to hinder the future distribution of protected materials. Brief for
Petitioners-Appellees at 10, 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987). The effect
of a regulation, however, and not the intent of such regulation is at issue. See Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 237 (1917); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1914);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911); Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875).
142. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708-09 (1931). The legislatures in
certain states have stated explicitly that their state RICO forfeiture proceeding is an in rem
proceeding against the property. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-7(c) (1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75D-5(c) (1987). Nevertheless, the constitutionality of these statutes, like those in
which the legislature is silent in classifying the forfeiture provision, depends upon an
examination of its substance and not its form. See Near, 283 U.S. at 708-09. The mere
classification as an in remproceeding does not automatically make the forfeiture provision
constitutional.
143. Near, 283 U.S. at 708-09.
144. Id. at 723.
145. Id. at 722-23. The injunction struck down in Near banned only future publications of
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also acts as a prior restraint. Bookstore owners, like newspaper
publishers, are distributors of protected speech. RICO's forfeiture

provision seizes all of a defendant's assets, whether such assets are
adjudged obscene or not. 46 This sanction, therefore, punishes the
racketeer for his past behavior in distributing obscene materials. In
addition, this sanction limits the future ability of the bookstore owner
or newspaper publisher to distribute nonobscene protected materi-

als.1 47 Thus, the effect of RICO's forfeiture provision acts as a
prospective restraint on both protected and unprotected speech.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Russello held that all profits and
proceeds derived from the racketeering activity are forfeitable.' 48 The
state may argue that seizing an adult bookstore's nonobscene materi-

als comes within the holding of Russello, since the alleged nonobscene
materials were obtained from the profits of the sale of the obscene
books and films. Yet, this would punish an individual indefinitely.
The effect would be an infringement on the defendant's first amendment rights with respect to nonobscene materials, and therefore the
forfeiture would constitute an impermissible prior restraint.

RICO is a vehicle to eliminate organized crime. 49 Obscenity is a
part of organized crime.15o The legislative history of RICO and cases
construing RICO support the view that the forfeiture provision is a
mechanism to eradicate future obscenity.' 5 1 In Russello, the Supreme
Court stated that RICO was "intended to provide new weapons of

unprecedented scope [to curtail].., organized crime and its economic
roots."' 52

This concept operates prospectively.

Forfeiture of a

"an obscene, lewd ... or ... malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper." Id. at 702.
The effects of RICO's forfeiture provision are broader than the effects of the injunction in Near
because the forfeiture provision seizes all property including nonobscene books and films.
Compare 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 479 N.E.2d 578, 589 n.8 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504
N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916
(1989) (RICO's forfeiture provision permits seizure orders which extend to protected materials
and neutral instrumentalities.) with Near, 283 U.S. at 702 (Minnesota statute provides for an
injunction only against an obscene, lewd, and lascivious newspaper.).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
147. See Near, 283 U.S. at 708-09.
148. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28-29 (1983).
149. Id. at 26-27. The view that the forfeiture provision is a mechanism to eradicate future
obscenity receives its support from the legislative intent expressly stated in the laws enacting
federal RICO: "The provisions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (1970). Therefore, Congress intended that the forfeiture provision be liberally
construed to help eradicate obscenity which is a part of the foundation of organized crime. See
id. at 84 Stat. 923 ("It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States ....").
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
151. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
152. Id.
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bookstore's assets prevents the individual from continuing to engage
in criminal activities and, in addition, prevents the future distribution
of nonobscene materials."5 3 The forfeiture provision, therefore, acts

as an unconstitutional prior restraint on a bookstore owner's first
amendment rights. Even if bookstore owners sell obscene, unprotected materials in addition to nonobscene materials, this does not
justify a prior restraint of first amendment freedoms. The Supreme
Court has held that it is better to allow some unprotected speech, than
to infringe the first amendment right concerning protected
expressions."'
In State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc.,"' the Supreme
Court of Idaho held that a padlock order was not a prior restraint.15 6 The court reasoned that the padlock order restricted all
speech through the forfeiture of property, and the restraint, therefore,
was not aimed at the content of the speech.157 The padlock order was
viewed as an in rem action because the forfeiture was directed at the
defendant's property.'
The Kidwell court misinterpreted Near as
requiring that the regulation of a future expression be content-based9
5
before the regulation could be characterized as a prior restraint.
Thus, the court in its holding adopted a narrower definition of prior
restraint than did the Supreme Court in Near. The Supreme Court of
Indiana, in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, l60 indirectly adopted the rationale of Kidwell, 16 1 when it held that RICO exacted forfeiture when the
elements of a pattern of racketeering activity were shown, regardless
of the nature or content of the assets. 16 2 Moreover, since RICO
153. The fact that an individual distributes obscene materials in the past cannot be grounds
to deprive him of his rights to distribute nonobscene, protected materials in the future.
General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 665, 320 So. 2d 668, 675 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
154. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (quoting Madison,
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 544 (1884)). But see Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931) (A statute aimed at suppressing communication cannot be sustained on

the grounds that it also regulates noncommunicative conduct.).
155. 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
156. Id. at 458, 631 P.2d at 629.
157. Id. at 456-57, 631 P.2d at 627-28.
158. Id. at 457, 631 P.2d at 628.
159. Id. at 456, 631 P.2d at 627.
160. 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987), rev'd sub
nom. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989). The Supreme Court of
Indiana's holding that all property may be forfeited regardless of the nature of the property

implied that it interpreted the statute to be content-neutral. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 564.
161. 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
162. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 564. See Western Business Systems, Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F.
Supp. 513, 514 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (A business' assets may be seized under RICO's forfeiture
provision regardless of the assets' nature.).
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allows forfeiture of all assets without distinguishing between obscene
and nonobscene, the court held it did not constitute a prior re1 63
straint.
The definition of prior restraint, however, is not restricted to content-based regulations. In Near, the Court defined the objectionable
statute as any "previous restraint," and not as previous restraints
based on content."6 Other courts defining prior restraint broadly
have followed Near. For example, the Supreme Court in Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 65 vacated a content-neutral injunction
enjoining persons from distributing any leaflets or literature because it
acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 66 If courts adopt the
Supreme Court's broad definition of prior restraint in Near, then the
forfeiture provision of RICO may be characterized as a prior
restraint, even though it was not intended to regulate content-based
materials.
The forfeiture provision acts as a prior restraint, regardless of the
fact that it restricts dissemination solely on the premises in question.
The Supreme Court has held that an individual's first amendment
rights cannot be curtailed simply because they may be exercised elsewhere.I67 Nevertheless, the Court in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,168
held that a closure order under a nuisance statute was not a prior
restraint, since the owner was free to carry on his bookselling business
at another location.' 69 The circumstances underlying violations of
RICO are different, however. Once a bookstore owner is found to
have violated RICO, he is not free to conduct his business elsewhere. 7 ° Should the bookstore owner attempt to sell or exhibit nonobscene materials in another location, the state will view the activity
at this new location as derived from the proceeds of past criminal
activity and, thus, subject the assets to forfeiture.' 7 Because the
owner is not free to carry on his bookselling activities at another loca163. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 564.

164. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). This definition was derived
from Blackstone's quotation adopted by the Near court. See supra note 86.

165. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
166. Id. at 419-20.
167. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (The availability of an alternative forum does not
justify an otherwise unconstitutional prior restraint.).
168. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
169. Id. at 705 & n.2.
170. See 18 U.S.C. 1963 (1982). The state in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith argued that RICO did

not operate as an impermissible prior restraint since 4447 Corporation could continue selling
nonobscene, protected materials elsewhere. Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 10, 4447 Corp.
v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987).

171. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (All profits and proceeds of a

1988]

RICO FORFEITUREAND ADULT BOOKSTORES

tion, the forfeiture provision under RICO prevents dissemination of
nonobscene materials in a given locality and, therefore, acts as a prior
restraint on the individual's first amendment rights.
Once it is determined that RICO's forfeiture provision constitutes a prior restraint on protected speech, there is a presumption that
it is unconstitutional.' 7 2 The second part of the prior restraint
analysis, as applied to RICO, examines the government's interest in
restraining a bookstore owner's first amendment rights. A prior
restraint is constitutional only in those exceptional cases in which the
government's interests outweigh the defendant's first amendment
rights, such as during a time of war.' 3 The existence of less restric-

tive means to accomplish the statute's purpose indicates that the
government's interest is insufficiently compelling to justify a prior
174
restraint on an individual's first amendment rights.
At various times, the Supreme Court has held that there is no
interest compelling enough to uphold a prior restraint of first amendment rights. 75 In Near, the state alleged that the purpose of a statute
racketeering activity are subject to forfeiture.). But see supra text accompanying note 33 &
145.
172. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57
(1965) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931).
173. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
174. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the court enunciated a four-part test
upholding the constitutionality of a regulation, even though it incidentally affected protected
speech. Id. at 376. Under the test, a governmental regulation is justified as a prior restraint if
it meets the following requirements:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged [fjirst (a]mendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. When one examines the O'Brien factors as applied to RICO, the last factor has
been the only factor questioned on grounds that there are other less restrictive means to
accomplish RICO's goal. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
175. But see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (The state's interest in
protecting the health of the community is an important governmental interest which is independent of any desire to suppress speech.).
The Supreme Court has viewed the government's interests as compelling in certain
obscenity cases. In these cases, prior restraints were upheld as constitutional. See New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (holding that a state's interest in preventing the sexual
exploitation and abuse of children was a compelling governmental interest); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (The Court upheld the sanctions imposed by the
FCC against Pacifica's broadcast of an obscene monologue and stressed the government's
interest in protecting the well being of children.); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
68-69 (1973) (Adult bookstores containing obscene materials can be regulated under "a
[s]tate's broad power to regulate commerce and protect the public environment.").
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declaring the publication of a malicious and scandalous newspaper a
nuisance was to protect "the public peace" from scandal and public
officials from defamation. 176 The Court held the statute invalid, reasoning that it was an unconstitutional prior restraint, and that there
were other remedies available to achieve the state's goals. 177 The
proper remedy for false accusations criticizing local officials was a
subsequent libel action, not a prepublication sanction which was, in
17
effect, complete censorship. 1
Although not absolute, the presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraints is so strong, that even a government's interest
in protecting an individual's sixth amendment' 79 right is insufficiently.
compelling enough to pass constitutional muster. In Nebraska Press
80 the Supreme Court held that
Ass'n v. Stuart,1
a judicial gag order'
imposed upon news organizations to protect an individual's right
to a fair trial was invalid.182 The defendant was being tried for mass
murder, and his trial had attracted widespread news coverage. 183 The
trial judge issued a gag order to insure the selection of an unprejudiced jury."" The Supreme Court examined the gag order to
determine whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifie[d] such invasion of free speech as [was] necessary to
avoid the danger."' 85 The Court held that the gag order infringed on
the press' first amendment right because there were other, less restrictive alternatives that could have reduced the harmful effect of such
publicity,' 6 and the benefits of the gag order were insufficiently compelling to outweigh the constitutional violation. 18 7 The Court, therefore, refused to allow a prior restraint on the press' first amendment
right to freedom of expression, even though it infringed upon another
176. Near, 283 U.S. at 720-22.
177. See id. at 718-21.
178. Id.
179. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
180. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
181. The judicial gag order in Nebraska Press prohibited the press from releasing to the
public any prior testimony. Id. at 542. The trial court reasoned that the prior testimony was
prejudicial and would make the selection of an impartial jury impossible. Id.
182. Id. at 570.
183. Id. at 542.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 562.
186. The Court discussed other alternatives, such as change of venue, postponement of
trial, and careful voir dire instructing the jurors to decide the case only on the evidence
presented. Id. at 563-64.
187. Id. at 568.
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constitutional guarantee. 1s
New York Times Co. v. United States, 8 9 popularly known as the
Pentagon Papers case, illustrates the need for the government to satisfy a heavy burden to justify a prior restraint on first amendment
rights. In New York Times, the government, for national security reasons, sought an injunction to suppress the publication of a classified
study of government policymaking during the Vietnam War.' I The
Supreme Court refused to recognize the government's national security reasons as an extraordinary and compelling interest and held that
the government's actions constituted a prior restraint.' 9' Therefore,
even a governmental interest such as national security is not extraordinary or compelling enough to overcome the presumption
that
192
prior restraints on free speech are unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of the forfeiture provision depends on
an examination of the state's interest in regulating adult materials. RICO's sole purpose is to eradicate organized crime.' 93 Under
RICO's forfeiture provision, the government may recover property
used in the course of, derived from, or realized through, organized
crime.' 94 It is difficult to view RICO's purpose to eradicate organized
crime as an extraordinary and compelling interest when the governmental interest associated with national security is not deemed an
extraordinary and compelling interest. 95 A sanction such as the
forfeiture of assets may be justified, however, even if it means
upholding a prior restraint on protected speech, because organized
crime has increasingly infiltrated the area of obscene materials. ' 96 The
trend may be toward upholding prior restraints' 97 after the Supreme
188. Id. at 570.
189. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 714.
191. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice White proposed other alternatives, apart from an
injunction, which the government could have used to prevent the press from publishing the
sensitive materials. Id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring). The newspapers were put on notice
of possible criminal sanctions available to the government had the newspapers decided to
publish any of the classified information. Id. at 735-38.
192. Id at 714.
193. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
194. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
195. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
196. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 2135
(1984).
197. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988) (A high
school principal exercising control over style and content of a student speech in schoolsponsored newspaper does not offend the first amendment.); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) (The Supreme Court upheld the school's sanction of a
student who gave a speech colored by obscene language and stressed the state's interest in
protecting minors from vulgar language.); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478
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Court's decision in Arcara, in which the Court found that the government's interest in protecting the health of the community outweighed
198
the defendant's first amendment rights.
Even if the government's interest is found to be compelling,
however, the availability of less restrictive methods to accomplish
RICO's goals - such as the traditional sanctions of fine and
imprisonment 199 seems to indicate that the government's interest in
using the forfeiture provision may not pass constitutional muster.
Moreover, courts have noted that injunctions aimed at removing particular items adjudged to be obscene are appropriate. 200 The availability of these less draconian sanctions deflates even the strongest of the
government's compelling interest arguments.
V.

CONCLUSION

Suppression of obscene materials has always been a primary goal
of the government. Attempts at regulating obscenity, however, have
proven to be constitutionally difficult. Unable to suppress obscenity
through nuisance and zoning laws, the federal and state governments
have recently turned to a criminal sanction: prosecution under
RICO. The sponsors of RICO intended to provide the government
with an effective tool to combat the racketeering activities that infiltrated the adult bookstores and to seize the proceeds from such activities. RICO's forfeiture provision was the tool provided to accomplish
this goal.
Regardless of the method employed, separating unprotected, obscene materials from protected, nonobscene materials has raised
troublesome first amendment issues.20 ' Under moral nuisance abatement laws, the padlock order and injunction were held to be unconsti202
tutional prior restraints on an individual's first amendment rights.
Similarly, RICO's forfeiture provision constitutes a prior re-straint
which infringes on an individual's first amendment right to freedom
of speech. A compelling or extraordinary governmental interest,
U.S. 328, 348 (1986) (Puerto Rico statute restricting the advertising of casino gambling to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens was upheld as constitutional); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Georgia sodomy statute was held not to violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals).
198. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).

199. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982). See supra note 20 & 25 and accompanying text.
200. See People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 57, 550 P.2d 600,
609 (A nuisance statute directed at particular obscene books or films is constitutional.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
201. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (The line is finely drawn between
constitutionally guaranteed free speech and speech which may be regulated.).
202. See supra note 97-99 and accompanying text.
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however, may justify the prior restraint. 4447 Corp. and other related
cases raise the question whether the government's goal of eradicating
organized crime is a sufficiently compelling interest that justifies total
forfeiture of an adult bookstore's assets. These decisions highlight the
difficulties courts face when balancing an individual's first amendment
right against the government's interest in suppressing racketeering.
One troubling aspect of RICO's forfeiture provision involves the
effect of such a sanction. Since many sellers of obscene materials also
distribute protected, nonobscene materials, a large percentage of these
protected materials will be subsequently unavailable if the forfeiture
provision is upheld. Forfeiture of a defendant's assets is not the only
remedy, however. Prior restraints against future distribution of particular items adjudged to be obscene are also a viable alternative. Yet
the most alarming implication arising from the forfeiture cases is that
this may only be the "tip of the iceberg." The threat of criminal prosecution and forfeiture of a business' assets is likely to have a "chilling
effect upon publishers, libraries, motion picture exhibitors and the
like."2 "3
A close examination of the forfeiture provision indicates that it is
an unconstitutional prior restraint of first amendment rights under
nuisance law analysis. Moreover, the government's interest in eradicating organized crime is not a sufficiently compelling interest to
forego first amendment protection. RICO's forfeiture provision' as
applied to adult bookstores and theaters, therefore, is too harsh a remedy to survive constitutional scrutiny.
ANA MARIA MARIN

203. State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, 93, 745 P.2d 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1270 (1988).

